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Health care reformwill beoneof the top issues
of the 2008 presidential election. In the face of
widespread public demand for changes in the
U.S. health care system, both Barack Obama and
John McCain have offered detailed proposals for
reform.
Senator Obama’s approach relies heavily on
government mandates, regulations, and subsi-
dies. He would mandate that employers provide
health care coverage for their workers and that
parents purchase health insurance for their chil-
dren. He would significantly increase regulation
of the insurance industry, establishing a stan-
dard minimum benefits package, and requiring
insurers to accept all applicants regardless of
their health. He would offer a variety of new and
expanded subsidies to middle- and low-income
Americans.
In contrast, John McCain emphasizes con-
sumer choice and greater competition in the
health care industry. He would move away from
our current employment-based insurance system
by replacing the current tax exclusion for
employer-provided insurance with a refundable
tax credit for individuals. At the same time he
would sharply deregulate the insurance industry
to increase competition.
SenatorMcCain’s proposal is far fromperfect,
but from a free-market perspective, it appears
superior to SenatorObama’s plan.Obama’s plan,
with its heavy reliance on government, leads to
the same problems that bedevil universal health
care systems all over the world: limited patient
choices and rationed care. McCain’s proposal is
muchmore consumer centered and taps into the
best aspects of the free market.
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Introduction
Our health care system is broken:
expensive, inefficient, and poorly adapt-
ed to an economy no longer built on
lifetime employment—a system that
exposes Americans to insecurity and
possible destitution.
—Sen. Barack Obama1
Controlling health care costs will take
fundamental change. Nothing short of
a complete reform of the culture of our
health care system and the way we pay
for it will suffice.
—Sen. JohnMcCain2
There is no doubt that voters see health
care reform as a major election issue, with
polls generally showing it trailing only the
economy and the war in Iraq among voter
concerns.3
This interest stems from an overwhelming
dissatisfaction with the current state of the
health care system. According to a November
2007 Gallup Poll, fully 56 percent of Ameri-
cans believe that our health care system has
major problems, and another 17 percent see it
as being “in crisis.”4 Virtually every aspect of
the health care system comes in for criticism.
Not surprisingly, given the amount of atten-
tion paid to the uninsured, “access to care” is
seen as thebiggest problem,with “cost” a close
second.5 But even the quality of health care,
long a strong suit of the U.S. system, comes in
for criticism, with 45 percent of voters believ-
ing that the quality of care is “poor” or “only
fair.”6
Thus, it is not surprising that both Barack
Obama and John McCain have offered de-
tailed proposals for health care reform.7 In
the broadest sense, both seek similar things.
Both would increase the number of insured
Americans (though both would fall short of
universal coverage), and both seek to reduce
the cost of health insurance and overall
health care spending. In fact, both make cost
control the highest priority of their plans.
However, the candidates differ signifi-
cantly in how to achieve their goals. Senator
Obama generally turns to the government
for answers. His plan relies heavily on gov-
ernment mandates, regulations, and subsi-
dies. On the other hand, with a few conspic-
uous lapses, Senator McCain leans toward
deregulation and free market approaches to
health care reform.
The results of these policies are likely to be
very different for the American health care
system. As Harvard University health profes-
sor Robert Blendon puts it, “It is one of the
biggest philosophical debates we’ve had in a
long time.”8 Voters this year will have a very
clear choice.
Barack Obama
Senator Obama has said that if he were
designing a health care system from scratch,
his preference would be for a single-payer sys-
tem“managed likeCanada’s.”9However, given
both the infrastructure of the existing system
and the political opposition to a single-payer
system, he has proposed a less radical ap-
proach while hoping that “it may be that we
end up transitioning to such a system.”10
Obama’s proposal is based on the concept
of “managed competition.” Originally devel-
oped by Stanford University economist Alain
Enthoven, among others, managed competi-
tion leaves the provision of health care in pri-
vate hands, but within an artificial market-
place rununder strict government control and
regulation.11 Insurers would operate much
like public utilities. Risk management or
underwriting would be prohibited, and the
government would have at least some say over
services provided and premiums. This is the
same concept that formed the basis for the
1993 Clinton health care plan,Mitt Romney’s
2006 Massachusetts legislation, and Hillary
Clinton’s 2008 campaign proposal.
Obama also appears to break somewhat
with recent Democratic orthodoxy on health
care reformbymaking the reduction of health
care costs at least as central to his proposals as
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achieving universal coverage. Coverage and
costs are, of course, inextricably linked. But
most Democrats, including Obama’s primary
opponents,were focused almost exclusively on
the question of how to provide health insur-
ance to those without it. That was the battle
cry of Sen. Hillary Clinton, who promised to
provide “health insurance for every single
American.”12
In contrast, Obama, while continuing to
call his proposal a “universal health care
plan,” has focusedmore on a combination of
regulations, cost cutting, and subsidies to
reduce both overall health care spending and
the price of insurance. He even appears will-
ing to concede that universal coverage is not
immediately achievable, and his own plan
does not aim for 100 percent coverage.
Even so,Obamaclearly seeksgreater govern-
ment control over the U.S. health care system.
In his book, theAudacity ofHope, he argues that
“the market alone cannot solve our health care
woes—in part because the market has proven
incapable of creating large enough insurance
pools to keep costs to individuals affordable, in
part because health care is not like other prod-
ucts or services (when your child gets sick, you
don’t go shopping for the best bargain).”13
As a result, he has been actively hostile to
market-based reforms such asHealth Savings
Accounts, which he dismisses as being based
on the idea that people have “an irrational
desire to purchase more than they need.”14
“The “freedom to choose,” he argues, “mag-
nifies the uneven risks and rewards of today’s
winner-take-all economy.”15
Not Quite Universal Coverage
Throughout theDemocratic primaries, one
of the key points of contention between Barak
Obama and Hillary Clinton was the question
of an individualmandate.16 Clinton supported
a requirement that every American buy health
insurance, whereas Obama eschewed a man-
date for adults.Hewould, though, require that
parents purchase insurance to cover their chil-
dren (generously defined as up to age 25).17
Obama argues that a mandate is unneces-
sary since Americans would buy health insur-
ance on their own if it were affordable. “My
belief is the reason that people don’t have it is
not because they don’t want it, but because
they can’t afford it,” he says.18Most of his pro-
posals are focused on making health insur-
ance more affordable, either by reducing the
cost of the insurance itself or subsidizing its
purchase.
He would require all employers to provide
their workers with insurance through a
“play-or-pay” mandate. Employers who do
not provide “meaningful coverage” for their
workers would be required to pay a penalty
equal to some percentage of their payroll into
a national fund thatwould provide insurance
to those uncovered workers.19 Obama’s cam-
paign materials do not specify how much
that penalty (which is effectively a tax) would
be. However, similar proposals have ranged
from 4 to 7 percent of payroll.20
Obama also leaves undefined the term
“meaningful coverage,” although elsewhere he
suggests that all insurance plans should offer
benefits at least as generous as those provided
through the Federal Employees Health Bene-
fit Program.
Finally, Obama does not appear to make
clear distinctions based on the size of the
employer, although in one speech he did say
that his mandate would apply to “all but the
smallest businesses.”21 Elsewhere he suggests
that “very smallbusinessesandstartups”would
be exempt.22Campaignofficialshave saidunof-
ficially that the exemption would apply to
“some number less than 15” employees.23 It
seems likely, therefore, that many of what
wouldnormally be considered small businesses
would fall under the mandate. This is signifi-
cant because small businesses are far less likely
to offer insurance today. Roughly 45 percent of
uninsuredworkers are employed by companies
with 25 or fewer workers.24
There are several problemswith an employ-
er mandate. First, while it might be politically
appealing to claim that business will bear the
new tax burden, nearly all economists would
see it quite differently. The amount of com-
pensation that a worker receives is a function
ofhis or her productivity. The employer is gen-
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erally indifferent to the composition of that
compensation. It can be in the form of wages,
benefits, or taxes. What matters is the total
cost of hiring that worker. Mandating an
increase in the cost of hiring a worker by
adding a new payroll tax does nothing to
increase thatworker’s productivity. Employers
will therefore seek ways to offset the added
cost by raising prices (the most unlikely solu-
tion in a competitive market), lowering wages,
reducing future wage increases, reducing oth-
er benefits (such as pensions), reducinghiring,
laying off current workers, or outsourcing.
Low-skilled and low-wage workers would
be particularly at risk. Roughly 43 percent of
uninsured workers are working within three
dollars of the minimum wage. The mandated
insurance costswill represent a proportionate-
ly significant increase in the cost of employing
those workers. At the same time, since wages
are already low and those workers receive few
other employment benefits, employers’ ability
to shift costs will be constrained. The most
likely outcome will be greater unemployment
for workers whose lack of skills does not justi-
fy the increased cost. Economists Katherine
Baicker of Harvard and Helen Levy of the
University ofMichigan estimate that a nation-
wide employer health insurance mandate
would result in the loss of approximately
315,000 jobs.25 And, in Obama’s case, the
impact could be considerably worse since the
candidate is also backing a “livingwage,” a sig-
nificant increase in the minimum wage that
would also lead to a substantial increase in the
cost of employing low-skilled workers.26
Second, by imposing an employer man-
date, Obama would further lock us into our
current employer-based health care system.
Employer-based health insurance is an his-
torical accident, stemming from a combina-
tion of labor shortages and wage-price con-
trols duringWorldWar II. It limits consumer
choice by giving decisions over insurance cov-
erage to employers rather than workers. It
means that workers who lose their jobs lose
their insurance. And it means that individu-
als who do not receive employer-provided
insurance face an increased financial burden
when they try to purchase insurance on their
own.
Obama also undercuts his opposition to
individual mandates by including a mandate
for parents to provide coverage for their chil-
dren. Surveys suggest that Obama is correct
when he cites cost as the primary reason why
people say they do not have health insur-
ance.27 It seems likely that, as he claims, if the
cost of health insurance can be reducedmore
people will purchase it, even in the absence of
a mandate. Moreover, it was the cost issue
that led him to criticize Hillary Clinton’s
individual mandate that “forces everyone to
buy insurance even if you can’t afford it.”28
But that critique also applies to a mandate
for covering children, whichObama supports.
In fact, the critique is evenmore relevant since
nearly 32 percent of uninsured children are in
families with incomes below $20,000 per year,
and 63.9 percent are from families with
incomes below $40,000 per year.29 Presumably
Obama would suggest that the cost would be
offset through the subsidies he would provide
(see below), but Clinton proposed subsidies as
well, and Obama still criticized her proposal.
Regardless, cost isn’t the only problem. If
Obama is going to require parents to insure
their children, hewill have to define what sort
of coverage meets that mandate. Obama’s
campaign literature does not specify what
benefits would have to be included. But, as
with the business mandate, there is a sugges-
tion that insurance must provide benefits at
least as generous as the Federal Employees
Health Benefits Program. That means many
people who are providing insurance for their
children today, and are perfectly happy with
that insurance, may have to switch plans in
order to comply with the requirements of the
mandate.
No matter what level of benefits Obama
initially requires, there will be enormous polit-
ical pressure to expand themandatedpackage.
Public choice dynamics are such that
providers (who would make money from the
increased demand for their services) and dis-
ease constituencies (whosemembers naturally
have an urgent desire for coverage of their ill-
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ness or condition) will always have a strong
incentive to lobby legislators for inclusion
under any minimum benefits package. The
public at largewill likely see resisting the small
cost increase caused by any particular addi-
tional benefit as unworthy of a similar effort.
It is a simple case of concentrated benefits and
diffused costs.
One only has to look to Massachusetts to
see that dynamic in action. Since implement-
ing its individual mandate in 2005, the state
hasdecreed thatby January2009,noone in the
state will be allowed to have insurance with
more than a $2,000 deductible or total out-of-
pocket costs of more than $5,000. In addition,
every policy in the state will be required to
phase incoverageofprescriptiondrugs, amove
that could add 5–15 percent to the cost of
insurance plans. Amove to require dental cov-
erage barely failed to pass and the dentists—
alongwith several other provider groups—have
not given up the effort to force their inclusion.
Those additionalmandates comeon topof the
40mandated benefits that the state had previ-
ously required, ranging from in vitro fertiliza-
tion to chiropractic services.
Nor does Obama’s own record inspire
much confidence that he would resist the
expansion of the minimum benefits package.
During his time in the Illinois state senate, he
voted for new mandated benefits every time
they came to the floor, at least 18 times, with-
out a single “no” vote.30 And, although there
are (as yet) few opportunities to vote on man-
dated benefits in the U.S. Senate, Obama was
a cosponsor of legislation establishing a feder-
al requirement that all insurers provide “men-
tal health parity,” one of the most expensive
mandates.31
There is also the question of how Obama
would enforce his children’s mandate. His
campaign literature is vague, although he
suggests such options as making proof of
insurance a requirement for enrolling chil-
dren in school or day care.32 This is an impor-
tant issue because insurance mandates are
notoriously hard to enforce.
Again, Massachusetts provides an excel-
lent example. TheMassachusetts health plan
has reduced the number of uninsured in the
state by slightly less than half, from 13 per-
cent of residents to 7 percent. However, more
than two-thirds of the newly insured are
receiving free or subsidized coverage. The
mandate itself has done little to reduce the
number of uninsured.33
Despite both the employer and children’s
mandates, Obama’s plan would still fall short
of universal coverage. Jonathan Gruber of the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology esti-
mates that Obama’s plan would leave roughly
15 million Americans uninsured.34 Obama
disputes this estimate, and even Gruber con-
cedes, “There is a lot of margin for error
around that estimate.”35 Still, Obama’s advis-
ers admit that at least 2 million people would
remain uncovered under his plan.36
Both of these estimates, however, fail to
take into account the impact of Obama’s pro-
posed regulatory policies, particularly his call
for guaranteed issue and community rating
(see below), which would likely increase the
number of uninsured. And Obama’s plans to
restrict the ability of insurers to spend money
on marketing could also make it less likely
that there will be significant increases in vol-
untary coverage. The result is that significant
numbers of Americans will remain uninsured.
A Heavy Regulatory Hand
Obama’s preference for greater regulation
and government control is not surprising
since he believes that one of the primary rea-
sons for the problems facing our health care
system is greedy pharmaceutical and insur-
ance companies “whopocket agrowing chunk
of themedical bills” paid by working people.37
His speeches attack the salaries of health
industry CEOs and drug and insurance com-
pany “profiteering.”38
Accordingly,Obamaproposesahostofnew
regulations that would substantially reshape
the insurance industry. He would require
insurers to accept all applicants regardless of
their health (guaranteed issue) and would for-
bid insurers from basing insurance premiums
on risk factors such as health or age (commu-
nity rating).
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Ironically, thesepolicies are actually likely to
increase the number of people who are unin-
sured.Althoughhigh-risk individuals aremore
likely to get insurance under such regulations,
that gain is likely to bemore than offset by the
number of low-risk individuals who forgo cov-
erage.39 As the Congressional Budget Office
has noted, community rating and guaranteed
issue make it more likely that people will
choose to go without health insurance.40 For
example, in the year after New York imposed
community rating in 1993, an estimated
500,000 people cancelled their insurance.41
This happens because community rating
raises premiums for young and healthy indi-
viduals, whereas both community rating and
guaranteed issue reduce or eliminate the
penalty for waiting to purchase insurance
until a person is older or sicker. As a result, the
young and healthy make the very logical
choice to forgo health insurance, assuming
that they can always purchase insurance later
when they need it. It is as if you could buy
retroactive auto insurance after you’ve had an
accident. As healthy individuals leave the
insurance pool, the proportion of those who
are sick in the pool grows ever greater, leading
to higher premiums which in turn causes the
healthiest remaining individuals to leave in
what amounts to an insurance death spiral.
This situation will leave Obama with two
unpalatable choices. He can revert to the indi-
vidual mandate that he currently opposes, in
effect denying the young and healthy the
option of opting out of the higher premiums.
Or he can attempt to reduce the cost to those
young and healthy individuals by increasing
subsidies and significantly increasing the cost
of his plan.
Obama also says he will force insurance
companies to “pay a reasonable share of their
profits on the patients they should be caring
for in the first place.”42 Although some of his
primary rivals favored a specific requirement
that 85 percent of premiums be spent on pro-
viding care, Obama has not spelled out what
hewould consider “reasonable” norwhat reg-
ulations he would favor to enforce such a
restriction. He would, however, require insur-
ers to disclose the percentage of premiums
that goes to patient care.43
Such calls for a minimum pay-out level
are politically popular, conjuring up the
image of huge insurance industry profits and
wasteful administrative overhead that can
safely be dispensed with. But, the insurance
industry today actually has a profitmargin of
just 5.5 percent for traditional insurers and
only 3.8 percent for Health Maintenance
Organizations.44
And insurance overhead includes many
useful services and programs. These include
efforts to monitor patient care to ensure that
thosewith chronicmedical conditions are get-
ting appropriate care (exactly the type of pro-
gram thatObama says hewants to encourage)
and efforts to combat fraud and abuse. Those
programs can actually reduce overall costs and
result in lower insurance premiums. Forcing
insurers to abandon those efforts could have
the perverse effect of increasing costs to con-
sumers.45
There have been a few state-level experi-
ments with minimum payout requirements,
notably in Kentucky and North Dakota, and
the results are cause for concern. Insurers
abandoned the market in those states and
left consumers with fewer choices and higher
premiums.46
Moregenerally,Obamapromises to“investi-
gate and prosecute the monopolization of the
insurance industry.”47 The conceptofmonopo-
lization of the health insurance industry seems
a bit odd, given that there are hundreds, if not
thousands of insurers in the market. The
American Association of Health Insurers has
more than 1,300member companies.48
Finally, Obama would create a National
Health Insurance Exchange, similar to the
“Connector” that was a central feature of then-
governor Mitt Romney’s plan in Massachu-
setts. The Exchange would have two functions.
First, it would serve as a clearinghouse, provid-
ing information to consumers and providing
one-stop shopping for health insurance. It
would “evaluateplansandmake thedifferences
among the plans, including cost of services,
public,” then assist individuals in purchasing
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the insurance of their choice.”49 In addition to
private plans, the Exchange would also market
the government-run option discussed below.
Second, it would act as a nationwide insur-
ance regulator. The Exchange would establish
“rules and standards for participating insur-
ance plans to ensure fairness and to make
individual coverage more affordable and
accessible.”50 The Exchange would also regu-
late premiums “so prices stay competitive and
fair.” Obama does not say whether insurance
companies would be free to offer policies for
sale outside the Exchange, or if they could,
whether theExchange’s ruleswould still apply.
Althoughnomechanismisdetailed,Obama
promises that insurance purchased through
the Exchange would be portable, meaning that
workers could take itwith themfrom job to job
and could keep it if they lost their job.
Presumably,workerswouldbeable to take their
employers contribution and purchase an indi-
vidual policy through the Exchange. In
Massachusetts that was accomplished by
requiring employers to set up a “cafeteria plan”
for their workers.51 Thatmechanismwas large-
lyanattempt tocircumvent federal tax lawsand
might not be necessary underObama’s plan.
Obamawould also imposenewcontrols on
the pharmaceutical industry. As with the
insurance industry, Obama frequently criti-
cizes the pharmaceutical industry for “dra-
matically overcharging Americans for what
they offer.”52 Specifically, Obama would have
the federal government negotiate directly with
drug companies to set prescription prices
under Medicare Part D. And, he would allow
the reimportation of drugs fromCanada.
Both proposals are defensible in the
abstract. Since in the case ofMedicare Part D
the government is the purchaser, there is no
reason that the government shouldn’t be
able to negotiate about what it pays just as it
does with any other goods and services that it
purchases. And consumers should be able to
purchase goods at the lowest price they can
find, even across borders. In practice, howev-
er, both proposals are likely to be implement-
ed in ways that will have serious adverse con-
sequences.
American research and development pro-
vides the innovation that produces most of
the modern pharmaceutical breakthroughs
that have helped cure diseases, improve the
quality of life for millions worldwide, and
saved countless lives. In fact, U.S. companies
have developed half of all new major medi-
cines patented worldwide over the past 20
years.53
Onaverage, it takes 12 to15 years and costs
asmuchas$800millionbefore a company can
bring a new drug to market.54 Those costs
must be recouped if innovation is to continue.
As a practical matter, however, Americans end
up paying for most of the costs of drug R&D
while the rest of the world free rides. That is
because most of the world imposes various
levels of price controls and refuses to paymar-
ket prices. Because the actual production of
drugs, as opposed to research and develop-
ment, is relatively cheap, pharmaceutical com-
panies have been able to segment their mar-
kets, selling drugs cheaper in other countries
while U.S. consumers pay full cost. For exam-
ple, brand-name drugs can cost as much as
two-thirds more in the United States as they
do across the border in Canada.
Ideally, if consumers were free to reimport
those less expensive drugs from Canada, the
pharmaceutical industry would respond by
refusing to sell their product in Canada under
that country’s price control regime. Canada
would be forced to raise prices to market lev-
els, and share some of the research and devel-
opment costs. Prices would eventually seek an
equilibrium: lower in the United States, high-
er in Canada.
Taken this way, reimportation would not
only be unobjectionable, it would be a step
toward freer markets generally.55 However,
Obama appears to lean toward a set of reim-
portation regulations that would prohibit
companies from limiting supplies or raising
prices abroad. In the Senate, he voted for the
Pharmaceutical Market Access and Safety Act
of 2004, sponsored by Sens. Byron Dorgan
and Olympia Snowe, which would have
allowed reimportation under precisely such a
restrictive regime. Pharmaceutical companies
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would have been prohibited from trying to
undercut other countries’ price controls.
In effect, allowing reimportation under
these restrictionswould simply create a “paral-
lel market” with drugs being reimported from
low-price to high-price markets. Eventually all
drugs would go to the low-price markets,
where companies can’t recover research and
development costs, only to be reimported to
high-price markets, effectively importing for-
eign price controls to ourmarkets. As Senator
Dorgan said, “It is my intention to force the
pharmaceutical industry to re-price their
drugs here in the United States.”56 The results
would be devastating for the future of phar-
maceutical development.
In exchange for this risk, American con-
sumers would see relatively little gain.
Although some patients with very high drug
costs would undoubtedly see substantial sav-
ings, the Congressional Budget Office found
that allowing drug importation would reduce
overall health care expenditures for the average
American consumer by just one percent.57
Similarly, allowing the government to
directly negotiate prices under Medicare Part
Dwould likely yieldminimal gain in exchange
for a great deal of potential pain. Private plans
under PartDhave already negotiated substan-
tial price reductions. The CBO estimates that,
unless Medicare were willing to impose rigid
formularies that would deny beneficiaries
access to many drugs, allowing the govern-
ment to directly negotiate prices is unlikely to
yield substantial additional savings.58
But even if having the government negoti-
ate with drug companies were somehow suc-
cessful in reducing prices, any cost savings
would come at the expense of pharmaceutical
innovation. Benjamin Zycher, senior fellow at
theManhattan Institute, estimates that allow-
ing Medicare to negotiate prices could reduce
pharmaceutical research and development by
as much as $10 billion per year. That would
substantially reduce the number of new drugs
coming tomarket and translate into 5million
lost life-years annually.59
Obama also raises the possibility of further
regulating the medical profession. He would
establish a new government institute to con-
duct research on the comparative effectiveness
of various types of treatment,medical technol-
ogy, anddrugs.60 Thegoalwouldbe to setprac-
tice standards based on efficiency and effec-
tiveness. Obama does not say how such
standards would be enforced, but a book by
one of his closest advisers, former Senate
majority leaderTomDaschle, suggests that the
standards could first be imposed on govern-
ment programs such as Medicare, Medicaid,
and veterans’ programs. Daschle believes that
private insurers would eventually adopt the
standards as part of their reimbursement
regime on a voluntary basis.
Although there is no doubt thatMedicare,
in particular, is largely indifferent to quality
in its current reimbursement policies, there is
reason to be concerned about whether the
program is well-suited for pay-for-perfor-
mance (P4P) measures.61 As a government
program, Medicare is a creature of the politi-
cal process. This means that the process of
designing a P4P schemewill inevitably be sub-
ject to political interference and interest
group lobbying that would likely lead to
errors at the outset.62 Moreover, Medicare has
a patient populationwith a disproportionate-
ly high incidence of chronic illness. As a
result, a P4P scheme is likely to create incen-
tives for physicians to avoid those patients or
to mistreat them.63 This does not necessarily
rule out adoptingP4P inMedicare, but it does
suggest caution.
Obama hints at going further than apply-
ing P4P to government programs, calling for
the Exchange to adopt P4P incentives for all
policies that are sold through it. Elsewhere he
has said that only plans thatmeet government
established minimum standards for “high
quality and cost control” would be eligible for
participation in the Exchange, suggesting that
he could make the practice standards manda-
tory for most insurance reimbursement.64
More Subsidies, More Government
Programs
Sen. Obama’s health care proposals envi-
sion both the expansion of existing govern-
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ment programs and the creation of new ones.
For example, he has said he will “expand eligi-
bility for the Medicaid and SCHIP pro-
grams.”65 Although Obama’s campaign does
not specify how far an Obama administration
would increase Medicaid and SCHiP eligibili-
ty, it is worth noting that in the Senate he vot-
ed for a proposal that would have allowed
states to increase SCHiP income eligibility to
400 percent of the poverty level ($83,000 for a
family of four).66 In addition, Obama would
provide other subsidies for individuals with
incomes above the SCHIP andMedicaid eligi-
bility levels who still cannot afford insurance
premiums. There are two significant dangers
to subsidies of this magnitude.
First, the expansion of subsidies would
greatly increase the number of people depen-
dent on government. We can expect this new
middle-class welfare benefit to generate many
of the same problems that accompany other
welfare programs, while creating a voting con-
stituency for ever-expanding benefits.
Second, the subsidies are liable to squeeze
out unsubsidized coverage. Many of those
who would become eligible for Medicaid or
SCHIPwill already have health insurance. The
expansionof theseprograms, then, shouldnot
be seen just as a method of increasing cover-
age, but as a way of shifting a large portion of
insurance costs from individuals to the tax
system. It becomes simply another form of
income redistribution, as taxpayers are forced
to pay at least part of the insurance bill for
manypeoplewhoare currentlypaying thatbill
for themselves.
This crowding-out phenomenon has been
readily apparent with both the traditional
Medicaid and SCHIP programs. A Robert
Wood Johnson Foundation survey of 22 stud-
ies of the relationship between government
insurance programs and private coverage con-
cluded that substitution of government for
private coverage “seems inevitable.”67 Other
studies have shown that when government
programs are cut back, private coverage
increases.68 And, the Congressional Budget
Office estimates that between one third and
one half of children who would be added to
the SCHIP program were already covered by
private health insurance.69
In addition, Sen. Obama has talked about
creating some form of reinsurance mecha-
nism to protect employers against catastroph-
ic health costs. If an employer’s health care
costs exceed some unspecified amount, the
government will “pick up the tab,” as long as
the employer agrees to pass any savings back
to workers.70 The Obama campaign provides
few details about how this reinsurance pro-
gram would work, but a similar plan was pro-
posed by Sen. John Kerry during the 2004
presidential campaign.71
A reinsurance program would almost cer-
tainly reduce insurance premiums for employ-
ers. It is not a really a cost-cutting mechanism
but rather a cost-shiftingmechanism. It would
simply move health care costs from employers
andemployees to taxpayers.More importantly,
by adding another layer of insulation between
health care consumers and costs, the program
could actually lead to increased costs. Once an
employee’s health care costs reach the cutoff
point and shift to the government, both the
employer and employee lose any incentive to
manage costs.
Finally, and most significantly, Senator
Obama would create a new government-run
health care program that would operate as a
voluntary alternative to private health insur-
ance. It would be available through the Ex-
change for thoseAmericanswhoarenoteligible
for any other government program such as
Medicare or Medicaid and who do not receive
insurance directly through their employer.
Small businesses and the self-employed would
also be able to participate.
Obama offers few details about what the
program would be like, but in the Audacity of
Hope, he suggests that he would have an inde-
pendent organization—perhaps the federal
Institute of Medicine—”determine what a
basic, high-quality health-care plan should
look like and how much it should cost.”72
Private insurerswouldbeable tobid tomanage
the program, but would be required to meet
criteria for quality established by the IOM.73
The government would also impose cost con-
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trols.74 The planmight be offered through the
Federal EmployeesHealthBenefits Programor
through separate programs established region-
ally or in each state.75 If the latter, the plan
would closely resemble the regional purchas-
ing pools proposed under the 1993 Clinton
health plan.76
Regardless of how it was structured or
administered, such a government-run plan
would have an inherent advantage in the mar-
ketplace because it would ultimately be subsi-
dized by American taxpayers. The government
plan could, for instance, keep its premiums
artificially low or offer extra benefits since it
can turn to the U.S. Treasury to cover any
shortfalls. Consumers would naturally be
attracted to the lower-cost, higher benefit gov-
ernment program, undercutting the private
market.And, thiswouldbe takingplace evenas
Obama’s proposed regulations were making it
harder forprivate insurance tomarket itsprod-
ucts or target products to specific consumers.
The result will be a slow but inexorable slide
toward government-run health care.
Costs
Obama’s campaign has variously estimat-
ed the cost of his plan to taxpayers as between
$50 billion and $65 billion per year.77 The
campaign suggest that his plan could be paid
for by repealing the Bush income tax cuts for
the top two brackets, increasing the taxes on
dividends and capital gains to Clinton-era lev-
els, and restoring the estate tax (with a $7mil-
lion exemption).78 However, Obama has also
suggested that the funds from repealing the
Bush tax cuts would be available to finance
Obama’s other spending initiatives, which
have been estimated at $300 billion–$800 bil-
lion per year.79 Clearly, some additional taxes
would therefore be necessary to pay for
Obama’s health care plan.
One place where he has suggested that he
might find additional funding is by capping
or otherwise restructuring an employer’s
ability to deduct the cost of providing health
insurance to their workers. Employers would
continue to be able to deduct the costs up to
the cost of the government-designed stan-
dard package, but would not be able to
deduct the cost of providing “fancy, gold-
plated executive health-care plans that fail to
provide any additional health benefits.”80
It is important to understand that this is a
very different proposal from plans to cap or
eliminate the tax exclusion for employer-pro-
vided insurance. The Obama plan is not
designed to shift us away from an employer-
based system—given Obama’s support for an
employer mandate, that would be impossible
anyway. Rather, it would simply push all
employers to offering uniform insurance
plans. The goal is not to create greater choice,
but fewer choices.
Moreover, the Obama campaign may be
underestimating the actual cost of his plan.
Jonathan Gruber puts the cost much higher,
perhaps as much as $102 billion per year.81
There are also some items within Obama’s
plan thatdonotyethave specificprice tags. For
example, it is impossible to know how much
Obama’s proposed expansion ofMedicaid and
SCHIP will cost without knowing income eli-
gibility levels. The bill that he voted for in the
Senate would have increased spending by
roughly $35 billion over five years. Similarly,
without knowing more details, the exact cost
ofhis catastrophic reinsurancepool is impossi-
ble to determine, although some observers
warn that it could be quite expensive.82
Obama claims that despite the program’s
costmost people will come out ahead because
other parts of his program will reduce premi-
ums by up to $2,500 per year.83 In particular,
Obama touts savings from the following:
Increased investment in health care IT tech-
nology. Obama would spend $50 billion on
health IT over the next five years. The cam-
paign cites a Rand Corporation study that
suggests wider use of health IT could save
$77 billion per year bymaking the health care
systemmore efficient.84
Improved disease management, better coor-
dination of care, best practices research, and
pay for performance. The campaign points to
a study by Kenneth Thorpe of Emory
University that estimates that 80 percent of
health care spending is associated with
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chronic illness. According to Thorpe, better
management of care for patients with chron-
ic diseases would result in substantial sav-
ings.85 The campaign also cites a Rand study
that predicts savings of up to $81 billion per
year from increased prevention and better
disease management.86
Reducing administrative costs and insurance
overhead. As noted above, Obama would heav-
ily regulate the insurance industry and believes
that doing so would significantly reduce costs.
The campaigndoes not link anyparticular reg-
ulation with specific savings, although it
believes that the savingscouldbeasmuchas12
percent of premiums.87 Although it does not
offer a specific basis for that number, it does
point to a Commonwealth Fund study that
estimates savings of $32 billion to $46 billion
per year frombringing the insurance industry’s
cost structure in line with that of other coun-
tries.88 All told, Obama’s advisers suggest that
his proposals would reduce total health care
costs in the United States by $120 billion to
$200 billion per year.89
But there is ample reason to be skeptical of
these predicted savings. The New York Times
editorial board notes that “there is little cer-
tainty abouthowmuch those [cost saving] ini-
tiatives might save, or when. Nor can it be
known if the savings would offset the poten-
tial cost of new technology and drugs and the
cost of providing care to the newly insured.”90
For example, preventive care advocates
assume that if we focus on preventive medi-
cine, we can prevent people from getting sick
in the first place. And by emphasizing timely
primary care, those who do end up with a
chronic illness will develop fewer complica-
tions. By spending money up front to reduce
the frequency and severity of illness we can
reduce the amount ofmoney needed to even-
tually treat those illnesses in the future.
As logical as this may seem, studies actual-
ly show that preventive care usually ends up
costingmoney in the long runbecause there is
noway toprecisely target such care.91 For every
disease that we prevent or catch early, we end
up testing and treating many people who will
never get sick. For example, Jay Bhattacharya,
a doctor and economist at Stanford’s School
ofMedicine, estimates that topreventonenew
case of diabetes, an anti-obesity programmust
treat five people.92 Similarly, a study of retirees
in California by Jonathan Gruber found that
when retirees had fewer doctor visits and filled
fewer prescriptions, overall medical spending
declined.93 People became ill more frequently,
but treating their illnesses was still less costly
than paying for preventive care for everyone.
Thus, increased preventive and primary care
may well be beneficial for the individual in
terms of health, butmaynot provide a societal
benefit in terms of reduced costs.
As an article in the New England Journal of
Medicine concluded, “Our findings suggest
that the broad generalizationsmade bymany
presidential candidates can be misleading.
These statements convey the message that
substantial resources can be saved through
prevention. Although some preventive mea-
sures do save money, the vast majority
reviewed in the health economics literature
do not.”94
TheObama campaignmay also be overesti-
mating the savings available from reducing the
administrative cost of insurance. Many pro-
posals to reduce administrative costs rely onan
unrealistic estimate of what is achievable. They
start with a low estimate of administrative
costsunder government-run systems, both for-
eign national health care systems andU.S. gov-
ernment programs such asMedicare, and sug-
gest that the administrative costs of private
insurance can be squeezed down to similar lev-
els. However, the administrative costs of gov-
ernment-run health insurance may be much
higher than commonly believed. For example,
a study by Patricia Danzon of the Wharton
School suggests that administrative costs
under Canada’s national health care system
actually exceed those of private U.S. insur-
ance.95 And a study by Benjamin Zycher con-
cludes that any savings from government
administration would be insufficient to offset
the costs of increased coverage.96
And, as mentioned above, many insurance
programs that fall under the definition of
administrative cost are beneficial and actually
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reduce overall costs and/or improve patient
outcomes. An arbitrary reduction could end
up harming consumers.
John McCain
While health care reformwas a central issue
of the Democratic presidential campaign, it
was far less important in the Republican pri-
maries. For that reason, among others, John
McCain has had less to say about health care
thanBarackObamahas so far. Still, he has put
forward a relatively detailed reform proposal—
one that heads in a totally different direction
than that taken by Sen. Obama.
McCain rejects “coercion and the use of
state power to mandate care, coverage, or
costs.”97 Rather, he says hewould “reform the
system through the mechanism that has
made the American economy the envy of the
world—free markets and competition.”98
Even more than Obama, McCain breaks
with the conventional wisdom that any health
care reform plan should be primarily con-
cerned with extending coverage to the unin-
sured. Instead, he says that he sees the cost of
health care as the most important problem
facing the system and would not “immediate-
ly focus . . . on a promise of universal cover-
age.”99 As one of McCain’s top advisers put it:
“You worry about the uninsured, but they are
a symptomof a larger problem. Unless you do
something about cost, you are chasing your
proverbial tail.”100
Because he is advocating market-based
reforms rather than government programs,
many observers fail to appreciate just how
radical an approach McCain is taking. Far
from a defense of the status quo, his plan
would significantly change the way health
care and health insurance are purchased,
delivered, and paid for. “If you take his plat-
form en masse, and begin with his premise
that it’s about cost and not access, then you
can pretty much declare a jihad against all
the stakeholders in the system,” said Paul
Keckley, director of the Deloitte Center of
Health Solutions.101
Confronting the Employer-Based System
At the heart of McCain’s proposal is a fun-
damental shift in the way we purchase insur-
ance. Currently, some70percent ofAmericans
receive insurance through their place of
employment.102 As discussed above, employ-
ment-based insurance hides much of the true
cost of health care to consumers, thereby
encouraging overconsumption. It also limits
consumer choice, since employers get the final
say in what type of insurance a worker will
receive. Itmeans that people who don’t receive
insurance through work are put at a signifi-
cant andcostlydisadvantage.And, of course, it
means that if you lose your job, you are likely
to end up uninsured as well.
McCain would move us away from our
employer-based system. He would count at
least some of a worker’s employer-paid insur-
ance as taxable income.103 (The campaign is
unclear about whether it would completely
eliminate the tax exclusion or simply cap it at
some level).At the sametime,hewouldprovide
all Americans with a refundable $2,500 tax
credit for individuals and $5,000 for families
(regardless of how people obtain their insur-
ance).104 Unlike some other tax credit propos-
als, the McCain plan does not have an income
eligibility cut-off or phase-out. His campaign
has also said that he is willing to consider risk-
rating the credit to provide additional help to
people with existing health problems that
might raise their premiums (meaning the sick
could receive a larger credit).105
Some critics of Senator McCain’s propos-
al havemisinterpreted ormisstated what this
proposal actuallymeans. They point out that
a $2,500 or $5,000 tax credit would be insuf-
ficient to purchase an insurance policy. They
suggest that McCain’s plan would leave
health insurance unaffordable and, if it
encouraged employers to drop their cover-
age, millions of Americans would face signif-
icant new costs or be left uninsured.
But McCain is not suggesting that the tax
credit be used to pay for insurance (except for
the currently uninsured, for whom any help is
better thanwhat they have today). Rather, he is
creating an incentive for employers to take the
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money they are currently using to buy health
insurance for their workers and give that mon-
ey to employees. Since on average employers
pay $8,824 for a worker’s insurance, that is
roughly what workers could expect to receive.
The tax creditmerely offsets the extra taxes that
theworkerwould otherwise have to pay if he or
she received that $8,824 as additional wages.
Of course, if you replace an unlimited tax
break with a limited tax break, some people
are liable to pay higher taxes. The McCain
campaign suggests that aworker in the top tax
bracket whose employer contributes more
than $14,285 per year toward paying for his or
her insurance could still end up with a tax
increase under this trade-off.106 According to
the Kaiser Family Foundation, just 6 percent
of workers are employed by companies where
the average employer contribution exceeded
$14,000, andnot all of thoseworkers are in the
top tax bracket.107 Nearly all lower- and mid-
dle-income workers would end up better off.
For example, according to McCain’s cam-
paign, a typical worker in the lowest tax brack-
et could expect to pay about $1,500 in taxes
andkeep the remainder of the $5,000 tax cred-
it.108 Critics note that this tax advantage may
not last. The size of the tax credit would grow
only at the rate of inflation, which is below the
rate of growth in health insurance premi-
ums.109 At the same time, this might actually
be a benefit of Sen.McCain’s proposal since it
would encourage people to be more thrifty in
the purchase of health insurance, choosing
high deductible policies for example.
The McCain campaign does not offer any
estimates of how much his proposal will
increase coverage. Analysis of other tax credit
proposals, most of which aremore targeted to
low-incomeworkers than theMcCain propos-
al, suggest that there would be a relatively
modest take-up rate among the currently
uninsured. That is because theuninsured, par-
ticularly low-income uninsured, are likely to
be extremely price sensitive, and the tax credit
is worth less than cost of a typical insurance
policy. For those with employer-provided
insurance today, this is not an issue since the
plan envisions employers either continuing to
purchase the insurance or shifting compensa-
tion from insurance to wages. But for those
uninsured today, the difference between the
cost of purchasing insurance and the amount
of the credit represents a new expense.
As a result, an earlier Bush administration
proposal for a refundable $1,000 tax credit tar-
geted to workers with incomes under $30,000
wouldhave insuredonly an additional 1.6mil-
lion individuals.110 Similarly, the Bush admin-
istration’s proposal for replacing the current
tax exclusion with a standard deduction was
projected to increase the number of insured
Americans by about 9.2 million people.111
TheMcCain proposal offers a considerably
more generous credit (and a credit rather than
a deduction) and will correspondingly have a
higher participation rate. If the tax credits are
risk-rated, that will also increase the number
of people who get insurance. Moreover,
because there is no upper income limit on eli-
gibility for the credit, the McCain plan would
also reach those middle-income uninsured
whomay be less price sensitive and better able
to navigate the individual insurance market.
And finally, the McCain tax credit should be
analyzed in conjunction with the regulatory
changes discussed below, which are designed
to make individual insurance more available
and easier to purchase. Looking at all of these
factors, Steve Parente, professor of finance at
the University of Minnesota, estimates that
the McCain plan would increase the number
of people with insurance by 23 million to 27
million.112
Moving from an employer/group based
insurance system to one based on individual-
ly purchased and owned insurance has left
Senator McCain open to criticism that his
proposal would disadvantage those with pre-
existing conditionswhooften find it difficult
to find affordable coverage in the individual
insurance market.113 Elizabeth Edwards, wife
a former Democratic presidential candidate
John Edwards, claimed that under McCain’s
plan, insurance companies “wouldn’t have to
cover preexisting conditions like melanoma
and breast cancer.”114 Indeed, unlike Senator
Obama, McCain would not require either
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guaranteed issue or community rating for
health insurance.
However, as noted above, McCain has con-
sidered risk-rating the tax credit that he would
offer, meaningmoremoney would be available
to those facing higher insurance costs. He
would also provide federal funds to help subsi-
dize state efforts to cover individuals with pre-
existing conditions.115 McCain offers few
details about exactly what state mechanism or
mechanisms he would support. Rather, he has
said that hewouldworkwith governors to find
a “best practice model” for creating a “Guaran-
teedAccess Plan” thatwould cover themedical-
ly uninsurable. He has described a potential
GAP as a nonprofit designed to include proce-
dures that better manage chronic illness and
reduce costs. He has also mentioned both
“high-riskpools” and states that designateBlue
Cross as an “insurer of last resort” as potential
models.116 Senator McCain has made only the
vaguest calculations of howmuch federal assis-
tance he would need. His aides have suggested
that it couldcost$7billion–$10billionper year,
but that projections “could change dramatical-
ly depending on how the program was struc-
tured.”117 He has not specified a funding
source,buthas raised the ideaofdivertingsome
Medicaid funds into the program.118
In essence, as Jonathan Gruber has point-
ed out, using government funds to finance
an insurance plan for the otherwise uninsur-
able simply shifts the subsidy process from
the insurance system to the tax system.119
This seems far more efficient, less regressive,
and less distorting than guaranteed issue and
community rating.
That is, unless the program becomes too
proscriptive—SenatorMcCainmentionsrequir-
ing GAPs to provide every patient with “nurse
care managers”120—or the federal financing
becomes simply another revenue windfall for
the states. (State governments already use
Medicaid as a way to shift costs from state to
federal taxpayers.)121 And, given that some 33
states already have high-risk pools and 4 others
designate an insurer of last resort, a new feder-
ally imposed program seems unnecessary.
Beyond such direct interventions, the
McCain campaign maintains that the sena-
tor’s proposal would make insurance more
affordable for everyone, including those with
preexisting conditions.122 In particular, by
making insurance more affordable to the
young and healthy, McCain’s plan will attract
them into themarket before they develop pre-
existing conditions. And McCain has men-
tioned that deregulation will likely lead to the
creation of new and innovative insurance
products that may help deal with these prob-
lems.123 AlthoughMcCain has not offered any
details of what these insurance products
would look like, Switzerland, which has a
health system that in someways resembles the
one that Senator McCain has talked about,
has begun experimenting with “long-term”
health insurance policies.124
Changing “How” Health Care Is Paid For
Fundamental to McCain’s vision of health
care reform is changing not just who pays for
health care, but how thathealth care is paid for.
Essentially McCain wants to challenge the
concept of traditional “fee-for-service” medi-
cine. “We should pay a single bill for high-
quality healthcare, not an endless series of bills
for pre-surgical tests andvisits, hospitalization
and surgery, and follow-up tests, drugs and
office visits.”125 As a McCain staffer puts it.
“You don’t want to pay per procedure. You
want to pay per episode, per outcome.”126
However, McCain provides few details
about how he would implement such a
change. It seems likely that he would focus on
government programs such as Medicare and
Medicaid. As noted, SenatorObama has called
for greater use of pay-for-performance and
quality standards inhowthegovernment reim-
burses under these programs. But Senator
McCain wants to go much further, virtually
ending the government’s reimbursement on a
fee-for-service basis.
Currently, Medicare hospital reimburse-
ments are based onDiagnosis RelatedGroups,
some 500 payment categories based on factors
such as diagnoses, procedure, age, sex, and the
presence of complications. As McCain’s top
health adviser puts it, this is “built on the false
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idea that Congress knows best the price sched-
ule for all physician services.”127 Instead, under
McCain’s proposal, physicians treating a dia-
betic patient would be compensated on such
things as how well they control the patient’s
blood sugar rather than getting paid on a per-
visit basis.128
Although McCain’s proposed reforms to
the way we pay for health care reflect a grow-
ing consensus among health care reformers,
there are reasons to be cautious about
whether Medicare serves as the best platform
to initiate reform—formuch the same reason
that it may not serve as the best vehicle for
Obama’s suggested injection of pay-for-per-
formance.
McCain also rightly calls for greater trans-
parency for health care costs and prices.
“Families, insurance companies, the govern-
ment—whoever is paying the bill—must
understand exactly what their care costs and
the outcome they received.”129
Deregulation (mostly)
Whereas Senator Obama’s plan relies
heavily on new regulation, Senator McCain
generally calls for deregulation, particularly
in the area of insurance.
Most notably, McCain would allow people
topurchasehealth insurance across state lines,
a practice that is currently prohibited by state
laws. Since health insurance is largely regulat-
ed at the state level, one of the major reasons
that costs differ so from state to state is
because of the varying regulations and man-
dates that states have chosen to impose. For
example, New Jersey has imposed more than
40mandated benefits, including in vitro fertil-
ization, contraceptives, chiropodists, and cov-
erage of children until they reach age 25.130
The state has also adopted community rating
andguaranteed issue. Inpart as a result of this,
the cost of a standard health insurance policy
for a healthy 25-year-old man would average
$5,580 in the state. A similar policy in
Kentucky, which has far fewer mandates and
no community rating or guaranteed issue,
would cost the same man only $960 per
year.131 Unfortunately, consumers are more or
less held prisoner by their state’s regulatory
regime. It is illegal for that hypothetical New
Jersey resident tobuy the cheaperhealth insur-
ance in Kentucky.
In contrast, if consumers were free to pur-
chase insurance in other states, they could in
effect “purchase” the regulations of that other
state. A consumer in New Jersey could avoid
the state’s regulatory costs and choose, say,
Kentucky, if that state’s regulations aligned
more closely with his or her preferences.Many
consumers would undoubtedly choose less
regulation. For example, young and healthy
individuals with low incomes may choose not
to buy coverage that forces them to subsidize
older, sicker (and generally wealthier) individ-
uals. For those risk-adverse individuals who
prefer greater regulatory protection, the cost
of those protections would be reflected in
higher premiums.
Senator McCain’s proposal would permit
this type of interstate competition. With mil-
lions of American consumers balancing costs
and risks, states would be forced to evaluate
whether their regulations offered true value or
simply reflect the influenceof special interests.
As McCain says, “nationwide insurance mar-
kets that ensure broad and vigorous competi-
tion will wring out excessive costs.”132
McCainwouldalsoallowpeople topurchase
insurance through nontraditional groups. To-
day, three typesoforganizationscanoffergroup
insurance: employers, unions, and trade associa-
tions.McCainwould open this to other groups,
notably churches and professional organiza-
tions.133
More problematically, hewould also allow
small businesses to band together in “associ-
ation health plans” (AHPs) to gain benefits
from pooling their risks. That makes sense if
the AHPs can choose among competing state
regulations, but there are reasons to be con-
cerned over creating federally regulated
AHPs. Doing so would be a step toward
greater federalization of insurance regula-
tion. As costly and damaging as much insur-
ance regulation is today, it is at least some-
what restrained by the fact that special
interests are forced to lobby in 50 state capi-
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tals. Moving the locus of insurance regula-
tion to Washington would simply create a
“one-stop shopping” center for lobbyists.
On the supply side, McCain supports
“innovative delivery systems, such as clinics in
retail outlets and other ways that provide
greater market flexibility in permitting appro-
priate roles for nurse practitioners, nurses, and
doctors.”134His campaignspeaksofhealthcare
being offered through a variety of venues such
as “Minute Clinic, COSTCO, banks, invest-
ment companies, hospital orhealth companies
such as Wellpoint, Humana or online services
such as Revolution Health, Google Health,
etc.,” with the government’s role limited to
establishing “some standards of transparency,
solvency, etc.”135
He has also called for “different licensing
schemes for medical providers.”136 In particu-
lar, McCain has suggested that some types of
care could be shifted to nurse practitioners
and other allied health personnel. “Weneed to
have flexibility in the delivery of care so physi-
cians can spendmore timeon the tasks they’re
suited for,” a McCain advisor explained.137
Although most medical licensing and scope-
of-practice laws are a state, not a federal,
purview, there are some actionsMcCain could
take in this area, particularly in terms of feder-
al reimbursement policies.
Unfortunately, not all of Sen. McCain’s
proposals are free-market oriented. McCain
was a co-sponsor (along with Sens. Edward
Kennedy and John Edwards) of the Patients’
Bill of Rights in 2001, which would have regu-
lated Health Maintenance Organizations.138
In particular, that legislation would have
allowed lawsuits against HMOs (and poten-
tially employers, some argue) in federal courts
over denial of claims. Of greater concern, the
legislation also contained an “any willing
provider” requirement, meaning health plans
could not limit which physicians could partic-
ipate in their plans.
McCain seems particularly hostile to the
pharmaceutical industry, sometimes employ-
ing Obamaesque language in attacking drug
companies. For example, during a Fox News
primary debate, formerMassachusetts gover-
nor Mitt Romney admonished McCain,
“Don’t turn the pharmaceutical companies
into the big bad guys.” McCain’s response:
“Well, they are!”139
In practice, there appears to be little differ-
ence between McCain’s policies toward the
drug industry and those proposed by Obama.
Like Obama, McCain would have the federal
government negotiate directly with drug com-
panies to set prescription prices under
Medicare Part D and allow the reimportation
of drugs from Canada. Like Obama, he voted
for the Pharmaceutical Market Access and
Safety Act of 2004. In fact, McCain expressly
decried drug companies that, “putting profit
before patients . . . have limited the supply of
pharmaceuticals to Canadian pharmacies and
wholesalers.”140
And, as with Senator Obama, Senator
McCain’s pharmaceutical proposals are unlike-
ly to achieve the savingshe envisions.Moreover,
any savings that they do achieve would poten-
tially come at the expense of pharmaceutical
research and development, reducing the num-
ber of new drugs brought to market and ulti-
mately costing lives.
Finally, McCain has pledged to streamline
and reform the FDAbureaucracy, although it
is not entirely clear whether his approach will
actually reduce regulation. While generally
supportive of measures to make the agency
more efficient, he has also supported propos-
als to expand its regulatory reach (including
cosponsoring a proposal to give the FDA
authority to regulate tobacco).141
Scaling Back Government Programs
Whereas Obama wants to expand most
government health care programs, McCain is
calling for measurers to reduce their costs.
McCain was one of only five Republican sena-
tors to vote against the Medicare prescription
drug benefit and remains critical of the pro-
gram.He has now called formeans-testing the
program so that couples with incomes of
more than $164,000 would not receive subsi-
dized coverage.142
During his time in the Senate, McCain has
consistently sought to reduce Medicare
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costs—a program he describes as “hurtling
toward bankruptcy.”143 For example, he has
voted in support of provisions that would
increase the age for Medicare eligibility to 67,
impose a new $5 copayment for home health
care visits, and means test the program gener-
ally. He also voted to gradually raise the
Medicare eligibility age from 65 to 67 between
2003 and 2027.144 In 2005, he voted to cut
Medicare spendingby$6.4billionby requiring
that beneficiaries purchase medical equip-
ment and cutting payments to home health
care providers.145 He has said that he would be
willing to “consider” ending the subsidy for
Medicare Advantage.146
McCain voted against the Democrats pro-
posed expansion of SCHIP, arguing that “the
programhas expandedbeyondwhatCongress
first intended. In some cases, SCHIP coverage
has been extended to middle-income children
and to certain adult populations.”147 Beyond,
the program’s costs, he has criticized the pro-
posed expansion as an “incremental govern-
ment control of health care.”148 However, he
supported a proposal by President Bush that
would have increased SCHIP spending by $20
billion over five years, although it would not
have expanded eligibility for theprogram.And
Senator McCain voted for the creation of
SCHIP in 1996.149
Although he has not discussed it in the
context of the current campaign, in the past
McCain has supported proposals to block
grantMedicaid funds and return responsibil-
ity for the program to the states in much the
same way as was done with cash welfare
(TANF).150
Finally,McCain would privatizemany vet-
erans’ health care services, allowing veterans
to seek care outside the current system. He
would provide every veteran with a fully
funded health account with a “swipe card”
that would provide access to existing VA
facilities or could be used to pay for private
doctors and hospitals.151
Cost
The McCain campaign has not provided
any estimate of how much his health care
proposals would cost. Nor has there been any
comprehensive independent analysis. Still,
one can assume that the overall cost will be
modest since Senator McCain calls for rela-
tively few new spending initiatives.
Themost expensive part of his proposal is
the refundable tax credit. That cost would be
offset by eliminating the current tax exclu-
sion for employer-provided insurance. The
Bush administration’s proposal for a stan-
dard deduction (discussed above) was pro-
jected to have a net revenue gain to the
Treasury of $14 billion.152 Since the McCain
tax credit is refundable and likely to have a
much higher take-up rate, it is unlikely to
produce a positive cash flow and will, in fact,
likely have a small net cost. And risk-rating
the credit would increase costs as well. The
National Taxpayers Union suggests the net
cost of McCain’s tax credit approach would
be around $3 billion per year.153
Other costs and savings under McCain’s
plan are far less clear. For example, if elected
would McCain seek to expand SCHIP as
much as would President Bush?What savings
could he expect from reforming Medicare?
Whatwill be the actual cost of theGuaranteed
Access Plan?
Like Obama, McCain assumes that greater
efficiency and a focus on preventive care will
reduce health care costs. And as with Senator
Obama, those assumptions should be ap-
proached with a great deal of skepticism.
Indeed, most of the criticism leveled against
Obama’s plan for “unrealistically high assump-
tions” about projected savings applies equally
to SenatorMcCain and his plan.154
Conclusion
Historically, Democrats have enjoyed an
electoral advantage onhealth care, and—in the
abstract—this year seems no different. When
asked which party they would prefer to see
handle health care reform, voters prefer
Democrats by a margin of 52 to 36.155
However, when it comes to specific ideas for
reform, voter preferences are far less clear, and
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Unfortunately,
not all of
McCain’s
proposals are
free-market
oriented.
that may make for a much more wide open
debate.
A recent Gallup poll showedmore than half
of all Americans supporting every suggested
health care reform, from the most market-ori-
ented policies to total government control (see
Figure 1).156More than half of voters said yes to
a government-run single-payer healthcare sys-
tem. But an even largermajority—more than 77
percent—favored “reducing government regula-
tionof insurance.”Roughly 81percent of voters
support a requirement that employers provide
health insurance to their workers—a proposal
supported byDemocratic presidential nominee
BarackObama. Yet 86 percent want to do away
with employment as a prerequisite for health
insurance, along the lines of a proposal by
Republican nominee JohnMcCain. Two-thirds
also agree with McCain’s call for a health care
taxcredit,but77percentagreewithObamathat
we should increase subsidies for low-income
Americans to help buy insurance, and 54 per-
centwould repeal the Bush tax cuts to do it.
Essentially, voters are saying that almost
anything is better than the status quo. The
candidate who makes the better case for his
reform will find a responsive public.
This year, the candidates offer dramatically
contrasting visions for reform. Interestingly,
they start from a similar point. Breaking from
the conventional wisdom of the recent health
care reformdebate, neither offers a proposal for
truly universal coverage, though both would
expand coverage significantly (particularly
Senator Obama). Rather, both McCain and
Obama recognize that the key question in
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Favored Health Care Reforms
Source: “Any Healthcare Reform Will Do for Americans,” Gallup Polls, October 25, 2007.
health care reformisnot coveragebut cost. In so
doing, they are reflecting a growing belief
among health care experts that the continued
growthofhealth care spending is unsustainable
andthat somethingmustbedone tobringcosts
under control. TheUnitedStates spends rough-
ly 17 percent of its Gross Domestic Product on
health care, far more than any other country,
and that is projected to rise to 20 percent of
GDP by 2015.157 Although that spending has
undoubtedly helped buy the highest quality
healthcare intheworld, thedistributionofcosts
has clearly made care unaffordable for many
businesses and individuals. Nor should we for-
get that the skyrocketing cost of government
health care programs like Medicare and Medi-
caid is threatening to bury our children under a
mountain of debt and taxes.
That is not to say thatObama andMcCain
agree on how to reduce health care costs.
Obama would rely much more on the heavy
hand of government. Among other things, he
would imposede factoprice controls on insur-
ance premiums and drug companies. He
would have the government establish national
practice standards for doctors. And, he would
create a National Health Insurance Exchange
as a sort of clearinghouse to make it easier for
businesses and individuals to shop for the best
insurance.
McCain, in contrast, would attempt topro-
mote greater competition among private
health insurers. He would allow people to buy
insurance plans across state lines, which will
help drive down rates. And he would try to
shift away from our current employment-
based insurance systemtowarda systemwhere
individuals purchase and own their own
insurance plans.
Both SenatorsObama andMcCain tend to
claim uncertain and unproven savings from
painless steps such as preventive care and
administrative simplification. There simply is
no magic bullet to reduce health care costs,
but neither campaign seems willing to admit
it. McCain, however, seems somewhat more
willing to admit that hard choices will be
involved—thatnot everyonewill get everything
they want.
Senator McCain’s plan is far from perfect.
In particular, his willingness to demonize
sectors of the health care industry and to
accept de facto price controls on prescription
drugs is problematic. There is often a discon-
nect between his populist pretensions and
his understanding of free markets that leads
to an inconsistency between parts of his pro-
posal. And it is possible to quibble even with
some of the more market-oriented aspects of
his plan (proposing a tax credit rather than a
deduction, for instance).158
Overall, however, he has the better pro-
posal. Senator Obama’s plan, with its heavy
reliance on government, leads to the same
problems that bedevil universal healthcare
systems all over the world: limited patient
choices and rationed care.McCain’s proposal
is much more consumer centered and taps
into the best aspects of the free market.
As such it stands a reasonable chance of
reducing health care costs. It won’t achieve
universal coverage, but it will likely increase
the number of people with health insurance.
And most importantly, it is far less likely
than SenatorObama’s proposal to do serious
harm.
The results ofMcCain’s andObama’s poli-
cies are likely to be very different for providers,
patients, and taxpayers. As November ap-
proaches, voters will come to a fork in the
road, and as Yogi Berra reputedly said, they’ll
take it.
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